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Although the 2007–2008 US credit crisis precipitated it, the
subsequent Irish credit crisis is an identifiably separate one, which
might have occurred in the absence of the U.S. crash. The
distinctive differences between them are notable. Many of the
apparent causal factors of the U.S. crisis are missing in the Irish
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four common features of the two credit crises: capital bonanzas,
asset price bubbles, regulatory imprudence, and moral hazard. The
particular manifestations of these four “deep” common features
are quite different in the two cases.
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This paper compares two linked, but separate, credit crises in the U.S. and Ireland, explores the
differences between them, and reaches some tentative conclusions about the “deep” common features
which caused them. The two crises are interesting theoretically since, although they occurred near-
simultaneously in two closely linked economies, from a superficial perspective they are quite
different. The two main building blocks for explaining the 2007–2008 U.S. crisis, subprime mortgages
and mortgage-related securities, were almost entirely absent from the Irish capital market and from
Irish financial institutions’ balance sheets. Three of the four catalysts for the subsequent Irish crisis
were absent from the U.S. case: large net borrowing by the banking sector in foreign debt markets,
extremely overpriced property markets relative to fundamentals, and very unsafe lending by the
banking sector for speculative property development. A fourth catalyst was the knock-on effects of theence Foundation of Ireland under grant 08/SRC/FM1389.
onnor), thomas.flavin@nuim.ie (T. Flavin), brian.okelly@dcu.ie (B. O’Kelly).
d. All rights reserved.
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environment was so precarious at the time of the U.S. crash that it is arguable that the Irish credit crisis
would have occurred even in the absence of this fourth catalyst.
We explore the differences between the two crises, and argue for four common features which
served as “deep” causal factors in the two crises. The first of these common features is the presence of
asset price bubbles. In both countries asset price bubbles developed during unusually benign economic
climates, the Great Moderation period in the USA and the Celtic Tiger period in Ireland. The second
common feature is very low real borrowing rates sustained by international capital inflows into both
countries (but inflows of different types of capital). Reinhart and Reinhart (2008) call this a capital
bonanza and we follow their terminology. The third is regulatory imprudence in response to political
pressure by special interests (but different types of political pressures serving different special interests
in the two countries). The fourth is moral hazard behaviour by agents in the financial sector and (for
Ireland) in the property development industry. The particular mechanisms by which these common
features caused credit crises in the two countries are surprisingly different in the two cases.
As noted by Cabellero and Krishnamurthy (2008), a distinguishing feature of financial crises is that
they are all superficially different, at least from themost recently preceding ones, since economic agents
are well-prepared for any set of circumstances clearly similar to those in recent past crises. This lack of
obvious historical repetitionmakes social scientific analysismore subtle, since this type of analysis relies
onhistorical sample data to buildmodels that explain and forecast. Explaining a particularfinancial crisis
on a superficial level will have little relevance for forecasting or preventing future ones. Hence it is
important to work at a deeper level in the search for common features. Our case-study comparison of
these two crises involves too small a sample to reach definitive conclusions, but we believe it is illumi-
nating andworthwhile. At a minimum, comparison of these two crises may persuade researchers not to
drawexcessively general conclusions from superficial examination of the particular circumstances of the
U.S. crisis alone. Another credit crisis occurred nearly simultaneously to themore prominent U.S. one, in
an economy closely linked to the US economy, and yet the specific causal mechanisms for the crisis were
very different. Given this, general conclusions from the particularities of the U.S. crisis are problematic.
In a series of papers and a book, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008a,b, 2009) provide a comprehensive
overviewoffinancial crises acrossmany countries and covering several centuries offinancial history. Our
paper is informed by the Reinhart and Rogoff research programme, and we use some of their taxonomy,
but we compare these two crises with a finer level of granularity than their much broader coverage of
global economic andfinancialhistory. Twoof the fourcommonfeatures thatwe identify, capitalbonanzas
and asset price bubbles, appear prominently in the Reinhart and Rogoff analysis. The other two, regu-
latory imprudence andmoral hazard, reflect the managerial, mixed-economy nature of both the US and
Irisheconomies. Inbothcases, governmental andmanagerial errorsplayedakey role in causing thecrises,
which would not be possible in the broad historical sample considered by Reinhart and Rogoff.
Section 2 compares the U.S. credit-liquidity crisis and the subsequent Irish banking crisis high-
lighting the substantial, somewhat surprising, differences between them. Section 3 discusses the asset
price bubbles which seem evident with hindsight in both the US and Irish economies in the periods
leading up to their crises. Section 4 describes the strong international capital inflows into both
countries during the pre-crisis periods, and the artificially low real interest rates that these capital
inflows supported. Section 5 looks at regulatory imprudence in the US and Ireland in the periods
leading up to the crises, and how this imprudence developed in response to domestic political pres-
sures. Section 6 looks at moral hazard behaviour by economic agents in the two countries, and
discusses how this contributed to each crisis. Section 7 summarizes and concludes the paper.2. Differences between the US and Irish crises
We begin by reviewing some key events in each of the two crises.1 The US crisis was the first to
emerge. The slowdown in real estate prices and the consequent downturn experienced after 2006 led1 Brunnermeier (2009) provides a more comprehensive review of the US crisis.
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increasingly concerned about the valuation of these pooled and tranched products. As most risk
models used inputs that were estimated during a period of appreciating property prices and favourable
economic conditions, they under-estimated the true risk of the securitized assets in the face of
a common shock. Coval et al. (2009) argue that a neglected feature of the securitization process is that
it substitutes risks that are largely diversifiable for risks that are highly systematic.
Downward pressure in asset values and credit quality led to a decrease in tranche prices. Conse-
quently, the rating agencieswere forced to downgrademanyof themortgage-backed securities, often by
several notches. For example, Craig et al. (2008) report that 90% of the CDO tranches underwritten by
Merrill Lynch were downgraded from AAA-rated to ‘junk’. These downgrades compounded the prob-
lems in the market as institutional investors with ratings-based mandates were compelled to sell off
these assets in extremely thinmarkets. This further compounded the downward spiral in tranche prices.
Dwyer andTkac (2009) estimate that global equity and government bondmarkets are approximately
100 times larger than the subprime mortgage-backed asset market. Despite the relatively small size of
thismarket, suchwas the toxicity of its assets and the lack of transparency and information surrounding
them that the turmoil was quickly and powerfully transmitted across many markets and countries.
Brunnermeier andPedersen (2009)model howadverse shocks in onemarket can spread throughout the
financial system. In the case of the US crisis, three key markets were affected. One, the mortgage pass-
through market, two, the credit derivatives market and in particular credit derivatives related to
underlyingmortgage assets, and three, relatedfinancingmarkets including the repomarket.Manyof the
mortgage securities were purchased by conduits, structured investment vehicles, and other types of
funds. These funds financed their purchases by issuing asset-backed commercial paper. This financing
method meant there was a high degree of leverage underpinning the mortgage securities markets.
The negative sentiment towards subprime mortgage assets spilled over into markets for other
structured debt. Liquidity shortages were exacerbated by a lack of appetite on the part of investors for
commercial paper even if backed by assets other thanmortgages. This followed a run onmoneymarket
funds because investor sought to hold only very short-term assets. This caused the transmission of the
crisis from institutions that were directly exposed to the US subprime market to those that relied on
short-termfinancing to fund their operations.Many fundswere forced to call on the contingent liquidity
lines provided by their bank sponsor. This put further pressure on bank liquidity. As the bad news
continued to flow, concern grew about the solvency of some market participants. Counterparty credit
concerns caused banks to hoard liquid assets.Market liquidity evaporated and prices for all but themost
liquid securities dipped. Libor rose substantially as banks were unwilling to lend to one another.
The US crisis emerged from a mis-understanding of the liquidity and credit risks associated with an
abundance of complex, relatively new financial products. The US crisis also precipitated a global
liquidity crisis.
While the emergence of the US crisis was evident from mid-2007 as mortgage defaults began to
gather pace, the Irish crisis did not manifest itself until a year later. In common with many countries
(see Aït-Sahalia et al., 2009) Ireland did not feel the full force of the turmoil until the collapse of
Lehman Brothers sent shock waves through international financial markets. The drying up of liquidity
exposed the fragility of the Irish financial sector. This vulnerability arose from a banking sector that had
become hugely over-exposed on the asset side to the domestic property and construction sector, and
on the liability side to interbank Euro borrowing markets; see Kelly (2009).
The global liquidity crisis following the Lehman Brothers collapse had severe repercussions for Irish
financial institutions, who found it difficult to roll over their enormous foreign borrowings. Their
problems were compounded by the rapidly deteriorating credit quality of their loan books, due to
adverse conditions in the domestic propertymarket. Falling housing and office demand and lower sales
prices combined to increase the default rate of property developers on loans. Irish financial institutions
came to the brink of extinction as many of their loans became impaired and significant write-downs
became unavoidable.
The full extent of the crisis in Ireland was brought into sharp focus in late September 2008 when,
only days after the Irish financial regulator had publicly assured investors as to the solidity of Irish
banks, the Irish government chose to step in and guarantee the deposits and debts of the six largest
financial institutions. The guarantee covered all retail and corporate deposits, interbank deposits,
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edly Anglo Irish Bank) was clearly unable to refinance its short-term liabilities at that date, the
government feared a systemic contagion if one bank was forced into liquidation. The government took
drastic action to stop such a scenario.
It is not clear that Anglo Irish Bank represented a systemic risk. Anglo Irish had a limited retail pres-
ence; it operatedbymaking large-scale commercial loans fundedby institutional borrowing.Otherbanks
may have wanted Anglo Irish included in the government support schemes since, as was subsequently
revealed, many developer loans with different banks were secured with the same collateral, creating
a complex web that would be difficult and costly to unwind if Anglo Irish alone were allowed to fail.
While the government bailout of Irish banks on September 30, 2008 was ostensibly to provide
confidence to the system and allow Irish banks to continue to borrow on international capital markets,
it has had much more far-reaching consequences for the Irish economy. The bailout created a contin-
gent claim on the Irish state of approximately V400 billion – more than double Irish GDP. Irish
sovereign debt yields and credit default swap (CDS) spreads jumped in the aftermath of the bailout
announcement, e.g. the Irish–German 5-year CDS spread almost doubled on the day of the bailout,
from 241 to 469 bps. Furthermore, the blanket guarantee created political tensions for Ireland as many
of her European neighbours were unhappy with Ireland’s unilateral action. Aït-Sahalia et al. (2009)
report that such liability guarantee programmes tend to send mixed signals to market participants
and raise fears about the health of the international financial system.
As well as the blanket guarantee, the government also promised to recapitalize the banks if and
when it was deemed necessary. Initially, the major banks expressed confidence that this financial
assistance would not be required. Speaking at the Oireachtas2 Committee on Finance and the Public
Service, Donal Forde, managing director of Allied Irish Bank, said: “We are not all the same. Allied Irish
Bank has made it clear we don’t feel we need capital”. However, this optimism was proved to be
misplaced. In the aftermath of the bailout, the true extent of the banking problems began to slowly
emerge and resulted in continued pressure on the Irish sovereign credit quality. In January 2009, Anglo
Irish Bank was nationalised as the Government determined that a recapitalisation programme could
not save this institution, while in February the two foremost banks, Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish
Bank, received capital injections of V3.5 billion each.
Asbadnewscontinued toflowfromthe Irishbankingsector, the Irishsovereigncameunder increasing
scrutiny. On March 30, 2009, Irish sovereign debt lost its much-coveted AAA rating when S&P down-
graded it to AAþ. Theothermain rating agencies followed suit and this begana series of debt downgrades
that saw Irish debt yields and market-implied probability of default rise throughout early 2009.
As the Irish banking crisis unfolded, it became increasingly clear that indigenous Irish banks were
unable to operate as normal and in particular, extend credit to businesses. In an attempt to restore
confidence to Irish banks and clean up their balance sheets, the Irish Government launched the
National Asset Management Agency (NAMA). The remit of this institutionwas to buy the riskiest loans
of the Irish banks at a price that reflected their long-term economic value, thus promoting investor
confidence in the banks and helping them to resume their normal functions. In return, the banks were
paid with government guaranteed securities, which could be used as collateral for European Central
Bank (ECB) liquid funding. In essence, NAMA can take a longer-term view of working out these loans
and has a 7–10 year time horizon. It is envisaged that NAMA will acquire a loan portfolio of approxi-
mately V80 billion. Following a loan-by-loan analysis, the transfer of eligible loans to NAMA began in
May 2010 and the level of impairment became obvious. The average discounts applied to the acquired
loans were almost 50% for the first, over 55% for the second and a predicted 58% for the third and final
tranche of eligible loans.
Another destabilizing factor for the Irish economyduring this periodwas the increasing gap between
government income and expenditure. An over-reliance on property-related taxes meant that the
collapse of the housing market had a devastating impact on tax revenues. Ireland’s financial difficulties
continued tomount as the Irish banking system required further capital injections. The budget situation2 Oireachtas is the Irish term for parliament.
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investment and thus should be treated as government spending. Consequently the 2009 deficit was
revised upwards to approximately 14.5% of GDP and the 2010 deficit reached 32% of GDP. As of March
2011, Irish banks have received approximately V50 billion in recapitalisation funds from the state.
Problems in Greece brought other countries in the Eurozonewith similar problems into sharp focus.
The Irish government found itself unable to borrow, while deposits steadily drained from the domestic
banks. Ireland was forced into a position where it had to accept a bailout package from the EU and IMF
in November of 2010. Under the terms of the bailout, Ireland will receive funding of up toV67.5 billion
in return for an IMF- and EU-monitored programme of fiscal retrenchment and economic reform.
Furthermore, Ireland has promised to repay all (sovereign and bank) bondholders in full.
An obvious big difference between the US and Irish crises is the troubled assets behind them. The US
2007–08 credit-liquidity crisis followed a period of rapid financial innovation, during which many
complex new products were introduced. The true aggregate risk profile of several technically complex,
interlinked US financial markets was not properly understood by regulators and participants,
precipitating a credit-liquidity crisis. In contrast, the Irish crisis evolved from a traditional credit boom
and bust. Irish domestic financial institutions availed of cheap short-term funds using Euro-
denominated bonds and interbank borrowing from Euro-area banks. The Irish banks used these
funds to extend excessive credit to domestic property developers. Irish banks’ loan books were also
poorly diversified, with an over-concentration on speculative development loans in an over-heated
Irish property market, while their liabilities included a large proportion of “hot money” interbank
deposits. These features made the Irish banks extremely vulnerable to the global liquidity crisis.
Irish domestic banks were not involved in financial securitization to any great extent. At the time of
the crisis, Irish banks had not yet adopted the ‘originate-and-distribute’ model for mortgage financing
which was dominant in the US. Irish banks still overwhelmingly employed the more traditional
‘originate-and-hold’ model. Approximately 75% of all bank loans were held on-balance sheet and
consequently the credit risk remained with the originating bank. Unlike in Germany and Japan, Irish
financial institutions also did not have any significant exposure to US-based mortgages or other US-
based securitized assets in their investment portfolios.
A related difference between the two crises was that the subprime mortgage market was in its
infancy in Irelandwhen the US crisis hits. Althoughmortgage quality had declined in Ireland during the
latter part of the Irish credit boom, the credit quality of most newmortgages was still relatively high by
contemporary US standards.
3. Asset price bubbles
As Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) make clear, the causal factors behind financial crises typically lie in
the boom periods preceding them. Asset price bubbles often develop during such booms, resulting in
a sustained deviation between asset prices and fundamentals that cannot be explained by random
shocks. Asset price bubbles are associated with periods of aggregate over-confidence and over-
optimism in security markets, often attracting new traders and speculators to the market. Their
presence, leading to over-inflated asset prices and excessive aggregate risk-taking, seems a clear
common feature of the both the US and Irish crises.
US financial markets were relatively tranquil during the early years of this century. Also, the speed
with which they recovered from adverse shocks, such as the collapse of the dot.com bubble, may have
served to imbue a feeling of invincibility among some market participants. Furthermore, the bailout to
the US financial system in thewake of the LTCM collapse (see Lowenstein, 2000) served to reinforce the
belief that certain participants were ‘too big to fail’ and would receive government support if trouble
flared. US financial institutions proceeded to pursue riskier strategies in the search for higher yield and
from 2002 to 2007 they were largely successful. Financial services industry common stocks enjoyed
large returns in both the US and Ireland.
Fig.1 presents the cumulative increase in themarket-wide equity indices in the US and Ireland from
1995 to 2010. Clearly, stock markets in both countries enjoyed a sustained period of success up to 2007.
However, these gains were not uniformly distributed across all sectors, with the financial sector in both
countries out-performing the rest of the domestic market. This is captured in Fig. 2, which shows the
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Fig. 1. US and Irish total stock market price indices.
G. Connor et al. / Journal of International Money and Finance 31 (2012) 60–79 65relative performance of the financial sector to the total domestic market for both the US and Ireland. In
both countries, financial stock prices grew rapidly relative to the total market index until the crisis
began to unfold. The Irish financial sector increased in value about twice that of other domestic stocks,
compared to about 1.5 times in the USA.
In Ireland, the rising confidence was generated by a sustained period of economic growth, leading
Ireland to be internationally acclaimed as the ‘Celtic Tiger’. Over the period 1994–2006, the Irish
economy grew rapidly with an average annual growth rate of approximately 7% and unemployment
falling to around 4% (near full employment). The economic boom and the subsequent ‘feel-good factor’
generated widespread over-confidence and contributed to the development of price bubbles in the
financial and property markets. This was the explanation offered to angry shareholders by Allied Irish
Bank chairman, Dermot Gleeson, in May 2009:3 For
Irish pr
a convi
price b“We drank too deeply from the national cup of, I suppose, confidence. The national mood of self-
confidence brewed itself up into overdrive.”The pre-crisis period was a sustained period of real estate price appreciation in both Ireland and the
US. In Ireland, residential and commercial property experienced huge price increases. A report by the
International Monetary Fund (2008) found that Ireland had the largest deviation of house prices from
fundamentals among a sample of 21 developed OECD countries at the end of the pre-crisis period
(December 2007). Fig. 3 shows average residential house prices from 1990 to 2010. Irish house prices
experienced rapid appreciation from the mid-1990s onwards. Between May 1996 and May 2000,
average Irish house prices doubled. One can make a convincing case that this late-1990s house price
doubling in Ireland was not a property bubble, rather, it represented a rational revaluation of Ireland’s
housing stock.3example, Kelly (2009) differentiates between the real-efficiency-based Irish growth phase of the late-1990s and the
operty and construction bubble of the early 2000s. Although he does not provide an explicit turning point, Kelly makes
ncing case that the second, subsequent doubling of house prices in Ireland (from 2000 to 2006) was a credit-fuelled
ubble.
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Fig. 2. Performance of the US and Irish financial services sector indices relative to their national market equity indices.
G. Connor et al. / Journal of International Money and Finance 31 (2012) 60–7966For the US, many commentators have noted (e.g., Gorton, 2008) that the subprimemortgagemarket
was fundamentally built on the assumption of ongoing house price increases. A typical subprime
mortgage was structured to refinance after a two- or three-year period. Such refinancing was only
possible if the house price had increased. In this way, a self-fulfilling bubble was generated as excessiveFig. 3. Irish new and second-hand house prices – 1990–2010.
G. Connor et al. / Journal of International Money and Finance 31 (2012) 60–79 67mortgage lending fed upon itself; with the growth of mortgage lending increasing housing prices and
justifying the assumption of further house price growth.
Fig. 4 compares house prices indices for Ireland with two alternative measures for the US from 2000
to 2010. The US indices are the Case-Shiller and the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). The former
is based on house prices from twentymetropolitan areas and thus excludes rural areas; while the latter
covers the entire country but omits higher value houses. Fig. 4 confirms that Irish house price appre-
ciation was rapid and at least on a par with the US experience which also had strong house price
appreciation during the 2000–2005 period. The implosion of the Irish bubble began later than in the US
but the decline has beenmore severe and as of December 2010 has shown little tendency to bottomout.
The Irish housing boom began as a rational response to increasing demand. Ireland experienced net
inward migration, and there also was a desire by the indigenous population to upgrade the existing
housing stock in response to increasing per-capita income levels. During the early part of the Celtic
Tiger period, increases in supply (see Fig. 5) were unable tomatch this demand and hence prices began
to increase sharply. This price trend was exacerbated during the later years from 2000 to 2006 when
over-aggressive bank lending flooded the market with property developers and speculative investors;
see Kelly (2009). Another key feature of an asset price bubble, as noted by Kindleberger (1989), is that
traders are often not interested in the asset for its intended use or its earning capacity but only in its
expected price appreciation. In Ireland, this was reflected in a significant increase in the number of
vacant properties, especially in the investment sector of the market (see FitzGerald, 2005). As prices
soared, Kelly (2007) and Rae and van den Noord (2006) both warned of the need for government and
regulators to take corrective action in Irish property markets, with Kelly (2007) predicting house price
declines of 60% over 8–9 years.
It has been argued that an overzealous imposition of restrictions on house planning and land re-
zoning contributed to the rising price of real estate in certain areas of the US; see Sowell (2010).
Even though the Irish house price boom occurred alongside a strong growth in the supply of dwellings,
planning regulations and restrictions also played a role in the development of the bubble. Regulations
made it difficult to construct new rural dwellings; instead there was a drive to build housing estates
within existing towns and villages. These restrictions served to increase the value of the stock of100
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G. Connor et al. / Journal of International Money and Finance 31 (2012) 60–7968pre-existing rural dwellings and undoubtedly contributed to the greater price appreciation in the
‘second-hand’ relative to the ‘new’ housing market (see Fig. 3).
4. Capital flow bonanza
According to Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), a common feature in banking crises is a sustained surge in
capital inflows in the run-up period before the crisis. Reinhart and Reinhart (2008) call this a capital
flow bonanza and we follow their terminology. They show that the probability of a banking crisis
conditional on a capital flow bonanza in the preceding period is substantially higher than the
unconditional probability. The US and Irish crises share the common feature of a capital flow bonanza
in the periods prior to their credit crises. However, it is notable that this capital bonanza took quite
different forms in the two cases.
In the US, large current account deficits throughout the run-up period were offset by large capital
account surpluses, with foreign funds flowing into US government debt securities and into mortgage-
based securitized assets. Net capital inflows into the USA grew strongly throughout the 2000–2006
period before slowing in the second half of 2007 and reversing to a net outflow in the second quarter of
2008, see St. Louis Federal Reserve (2011). Reinhart and Rogoff (2008b) show that countries experi-
encing banking crises tend to have large, sustained current account deficits during the pre-crisis run-
up period. The U.S. had this experience in the period prior to the crisis.
The Irish boom had two distinct phases; namely the Celtic Tiger era of 1997–2002 and a later bubble
period, 2003–2007. Capital inflows during these growth episodes are presented in Fig. 6. The former
period saw a growth in foreign direct investment (FDI) inward investment and a reduction in the
proportion of equity and debt liabilities employed. In contrast, the later bubble period saw a decline in
FDI and a clear substitution with foreign capital in the form of debt and equity funding. An important
difference between those two episodes is that the Celtic Tiger saw an accumulation of real assets and
investments that conferred long-term benefits on the economy, while the bubble era resulted in
financial assets that were easily reversible and quickly withdrawn during the economic downturn. A
similar story emerged from the Asian crisis of 1997–98 where Taiwan, a country that had successfully
attracted FDI investment, fared far better thanmany of its neighbours who had resisted FDI investment
and instead accessed foreign capital in the form of debt and equity investment, e.g. Korea. As the crisis
escalated, equity investors withdrew their capital, while FDI investors remained in the region (see
Flavin and Panopoulou, 2009 and references therein).
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G. Connor et al. / Journal of International Money and Finance 31 (2012) 60–79 69During the bubble period, the Irish capital bonanza was mediated by the domestic commercial
banks. In 1999, Irish banks were funded primarily from domestic sources; see Table 1. By 2008, Irish
customer deposits provided just 22% of domestic bank funding. Over 37% of the funding was obtained
in the form of deposits and securities from the international capital markets. Though admittedly
starting from a very low base, international sources of funds grew a hundred fold in the period 1999–
2008 and this substantial capital inflow helped the balance sheets of the Irish banks to increase more
than six-fold over the same period. Fig. 7 contrasts the liabilities of the banking sector in 1999 and
2008. On the back of this, lending to the non-financial private sector had grown to more than 200% of
GDP by end of 2008, approximately twice the European average. At the time of writing, the most recent
data (to May 2010) reveals a modest decline in overall liabilities but interestingly, there is a sharper
decline in the proportion of funding sourced in international markets.
In the US, an unusually low real rate of interest and low risk-adjusted required rates on risky
investments was a significant feature of this period, related to the capital bonanza. US monetary policy
was notably accommodative during the US pre-crisis period; Taylor (2008) argues that this was the
main causal factor of the US crisis. In an interesting parallel, a significant factor in the creation of the
Irish property bubble was the low interest rates imposed on Ireland following Ireland’s admission toTable 1
Composition of Irish banking liabilities, 1999, 2008 and 2010.
Dec-99 Dec-08 May-10 Dec-99 Dec-08 May-10
Deposits from non-Irish credit institutions 15,542 149,465 133,805 19.8% 29.1% 26.1%
Irish customer deposits 35,142 114,235 112,491 44.8% 22.2% 22.0%
Deposits from Irish credit institutions 6472 87,196 100,345 8.2% 17.0% 19.6%
Other liabilities 9671 57,227 59,510 12.3% 11.1% 11.6%
Debt securities – non-Irish 71 43,574 34,298 0.1% 8.5% 6.7%
Non-Irish customer deposits 4336 23,415 18,083 5.5% 4.6% 3.5%
Debt securities to Irish residents 241 19,092 24,982 0.3% 3.7% 4.9%
Capital and reserves 6990 19,746 28,550 8.9% 3.8% 5.6%
78,465 513,950 512,064 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Source: Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland. Table C4, Quarterly Bulletin.
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the one-size-fits-all approach to monetary policy, as the Irish business cycle was generally asynchro-
nous with that of its European neighbours. As noted above, Ireland maintained a high rate of economic
growth over the period from 1995 to 2005, with growth substantially higher than the Eurozone
average. With nominal interest rates set by the European Central Bank (ECB) to cater for the entire
Eurozone, and exchange rates fixed within the Eurozone, Ireland had great difficulty maintaining its
inflation ratewithin the range demanded by the criteria set down in the creation of the single currency.
An inflation rate that was above the EU average, together with low nominal rates set by the ECB, meant
that during the pre-crisis period Ireland had very low, mostly negative, real interest rates. The ECB
policy rate was less than Irish inflation rate for most of the ten years prior to the crisis (see Fig. 8).
After Ireland’s entry to the Eurozone, Irish banks funded much of their lending with short-term
foreign borrowing. This allowed Irish financial institutions to extend much larger volumes of credit
to borrowers at lower cost, as evidenced by Fig. 8. As a small member of the Eurozone, Ireland does not
have sole control of its interest rates, but Fig. 9 shows a hypothetical Irish-only target rate calculated
from a standard Taylor rule. We set the target rate equal to 1/2(GDP growth rate 3%)þ 1/2(inflation
rate 2%)þ 1%. Had Eurozone interest rates been set in accordance with a Taylor rule for Ireland, the
interest rate would have been almost 6 percentage points higher on average during the period and up
to 12 percentage points higher in 2000.5. Regulatory imprudence
An important common feature of the two crises was regulatory imprudence. In both countries,
policymakers and regulators allowed the risk profiles of their financial services sectors to evolve in very
dangerous ways, influenced by strong domestic political pressures. Interestingly, the nature of the
political pressures that swayed policymakers in the two countries was quite different, and the detailed
nature of the policy and regulatory errors was also dissimilar.
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G. Connor et al. / Journal of International Money and Finance 31 (2012) 60–79 71The seeds of the U.S. crisis lie in the subprime mortgage market. It is important for comparative
purposes to note that this market is almost uniquely American. The subprime mortgage market serves
a politically important role in U.S. housing policy. In effect, it supplements or replaces the burdensome
government expenditures on social-housing programmes that are common in other developed nations-16%
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through subprime lending was very successful. In March 2000, Fannie Mae announced its American
Dream Commitment: an aggressive corporate strategy to purchase $2 trillion in mortgage loans for poor
and minority households over the following ten years. The period 2000–2007 saw a strong trajectory
towards meeting this target. Home ownership in the US grew from 64% in 2004, where it had been for
almost two decades, to 69% in 2007, a spectacular increase of 5 percentage points in five years, with
particularly high rates of increase among Blacks and Hispanics. From the perspective of increasing
home ownership as a political and regulatory goal, the pre-crisis period was an outstandingly
successful period. However, to quote Shiller (2010):4 In h
increas
skewin“Encouraging homeownership is a worthy and admirable national goal. It conveys a sense of
participation and belonging, and high homeownership rates are beneficial to a healthy society.. But
the subprime housing dilemma in the United States points up problems with over-promoting
homeownership. Homeownership, for all its advantages, is not the ideal housing arrangement for
all people in all circumstances. And we are now coming to appreciate the reality of this.”Analysts now accept that during the pre-crisis period the securitized mortgage market grew
excessively. This excessive growth can be traced, at least in part, to political pressures (Issa, 2009).
Many subprime borrowers had poor-credit histories and undocumented income. They lacked the two
essential ingredients normally demanded of borrowers: a substantial down payment and a verifiable
source of steady income to meet the ongoing repayments.
Securitized subprime mortgages represented an American solution to the social problem of
providing low-income housing. Securitization was viewed as a positive development which gave the
benefits of credit risk diversification and the expansion of trading opportunities. The consequent
increase in moral hazard problems (discussed in the next section) was downplayed or ignored.
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) refer to the “this time is different” cognitive error, in which economic
agents convince themselves that new technologies have eliminated traditional sources of financial risk.
This type of cognitive error was clearly a feature in regulatory and managerial responses to the
enormous growth in mortgage-related securities markets during the early years of the new century.
With hindsight, the diversification benefits seem to have been exaggerated due to the similarity of the
securitized products and the credit and liquidity risks arising from cross-holdings of assets by large
financial institutions. Many of these products were so complex that much of the cross-holdings may
have arisen not by construction but inadvertently. Kiyotaki and Moore (2002) argue that high corre-
lations may arise through interlinkages which are not at first apparent to the market due to their
complexity.
In the US, in addition to political pressure to increase home ownership, there was purely self-
interested lobbying by business interests involved in the lucrative mortgage securitization process
and in mortgage-security-related trading.4 Igan et al. (2009) find evidence of attempts at regulatory
capture in the U.S. They find that the lenders who lobbied most intensively on specific issues related to
mortgage lending were those who originated mortgages with higher loan-to-value ratios, securitized
a faster-growing proportion of their loans and had faster-growing loan portfolios. They suggest that
lobbying was linked to lenders expecting special treatments from policymakers, allowing them to
engage in riskier lending behaviour. They further suggest that lending behaviour was affected by the
politics of special interest groups. Dell’Arriccia et al. (2008) present evidence that lending standards
declined in regions where the credit boom was larger, that lower regional lending standards were
associated with a faster rate of house price appreciation, and lending standards declined more in
regions where new competitors entered the market and where a larger proportion of loans was
securitized.
In Ireland as in the USA, political pressures skewed the financial regulatory setting, but in very
different ways. Starting in the early 1990s, the Irish government made a strategic decision to becomeis commentary on an earlier version of our paper, Krugman (2010) argues that the purported US political pressure for
ed home ownership was more feigned than real and that lobbying by business interests was a more important factor in
g US regulatory policies.
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operations in Ireland, the main attractions were an educated, English-speaking workforce, a Western
European location, and light-touch, almost nonexistent, tax and regulatory oversight. This very lax
supervisory regime led The New York Times to call Ireland “the wild west of European finance.”5
An unintended consequence of the extremely light-touch financial regulatory regime in Ireland
was to hobble Irish regulators in their oversight of domestic banks. The actions of the Irish financial
regulator during this period were secretive with limited public disclosure. In a 2009 appearance
before the Irish parliament, the newly appointed head of the Irish Central Bank called for an official
investigation into bank regulation during the pre-crisis period, modelled on the US Financial Crisis
Inquiry Commission. At present, most of what is known was revealed inadvertently or through leaks
to the media. Ross (2009) conducts an investigative study and argues that the regulatory regime for
domestic Irish banks during the pre-crisis period was extremely weak and ineffective. As Ross
recounts, the only aggressive actions of the Irish financial regulator seemed to be directed at media
leaks; its relationship with the financial services sector was very accommodating and compliant. For
example, for eight years, the board chairman and other directors at Anglo Irish Bank hid very large
personal loans by temporarily transferring them just prior to accounting year-end to other banks
complicit in the scheme, and then by pre-agreement rolling the loans back into Anglo Irish imme-
diately after the publication of the annual accounts. It is not yet clear6 whether the regulator
approved, ignored, or missed this subterfuge, but no regulatory action was or has been taken. Also,
Anglo Irish Bank deliberately understated its loans-to-deposits ratio through sham transactions – this
took the form of agreed interbank lending by Anglo to another Irish domestic bank just before
reporting year-end, and then immediately accepting the funds back from the other bank as “customer
savings deposits.” In this case there is considerable evidence (obtained via media leaks) that the Irish
financial regulator informally approved of the stratagem.7 In 2007, Anglo Irish became aware that
a large shareholder was preparing to sell a 10% position in Anglo Irish shares. To prevent this share
sale from impacting its share market price, Anglo senior management organized a secret circle of ten
wealthy bank clients, lent each of them V30 million for the purchase of Anglo shares, with limited
recourse on the loans beyond the purchased shares as collateral. Since the loans were with limited
recourse to the borrowers, Anglo was the at-risk investor in the shares, and was essentially using
V300 million of its depositors’ funds to secretly purchase its own equity shares. Again, there have
been no prosecutions, and there is (disputed) evidence that the financial regulator was at least dimly
aware of this share manipulation scheme.8
In addition to ignoring, or even condoning, fraudulent accounting, the financial regulator and Irish
central bank made strategic errors in not responding to the build-up of systemic risk to the banking
system. Honohan (2009) provides a careful analysis of the major policy errors by the Irish financial
regulator and Irish central bank during the pre-crisis period. He notes that rapid balance-sheet growth
of financial institutions – usually interpreted as growth of more than 20% per annum in any year – is
a basic warning sign used by financial regulators. The balance sheets of Anglo and Irish Nationwide
expanded by an average of 36% and 20% per year over the ten-year period from 1998 to 2007. Honohan
argues that, using standard procedures, the Irish financial regulator should have acted on the systemic
risk generated by these extremely high balance-sheet growth rates. Furthermore, the overly concen-
trated focus of the banking sectors’ lending activities on property development should have been acted
upon. In addition to inadequately responding to system-wide distortions, the Irish regulator over-
looked obvious distortions in the risk profiles of individual banks. For example, Irish Nationwide was
a building society established to provide mortgages to its members. Yet it was allowed by the regulator
to put its members’ funds at risk by lending 80% of its funds to a small number of property developers.
By 2006, only a small proportion of its loan book consisted of retail mortgages; although providing
these retail mortgages was its purported institutional mission.5 Lavery and O’Brien (2005).
6 See Weston (2009).
7 See Lord (2009).
8 See O’Brien et al. (2009) and Oliver (2009).
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lending criteria. As Anglo Irish Bank and Irish Nationwide pursued very aggressive lending policies,
more traditional banks responded by being more accommodating to potential borrowers. Increasing
rivalry between institutions for market share is cited as a reason for the parallel decline in standards;
see Honohan (2009).
Although the major sources of systemic risk were the overuse of interbank borrowing and the over-
concentration on very risky property development loans, the credit quality of new residential mort-
gages in Ireland also declined substantially during the run-up period. Fig. 10 shows that more mort-
gages were for higher loan-to-value; the percentage of mortgages for greater than 95% of the property
value increased from 6% to 16% in the period 2004–2007. Likewise, Fig. 11 shows that the maturity of
the mortgages lengthened, with the percentage of loans with a maturity of greater than 30 years
jumping from 10% to 35% in the period 2004–2007.
Woods (2007) reports that, as a proportion of lending to the private sector, property-related lending
grew from 38% in 2001 to over 62% in 2007. With the enormous growth in property- and construction-
related lending, the loan books of Irish domestic banks were becoming increasingly undiversified.
While commercial property prices continued to surge up to 2006, rental income did not follow suit.
This resulted in low-income yields in Ireland relative to European neighbours. Consequently, investors
in this sector were relying heavily on capital gains for their prospective returns.
Another source of regulatory imprudence in Irelandwas the long and close relationship between the
Fianna Fáil political party (the dominant party in coalition governments during most of the pre-crisis
period) and the Irish property development industry; see MacDonald and Sheridan (2008) for
a detailed discussion. Also, the public exchequer was becoming ever more reliant on taxes from this
sector. The tax take fromstampdutyon thepurchase of propertywas, at thepeakof houseprices in2006,
accounting for about 17% of all tax revenues. When one adds on the income tax paid by construction
workers and value-added tax collected on property sales, the industry was contributing about one-fifth
of all government tax revenue. The government did not have the political will to dampen the sector.
In addition to the enormous credit inflow discussed in the previous section, the over-heating of the
Irish property market was exacerbated by government legislation that encouraged people to invest in
property through a series of tax-incentive schemes. For example, generous tax relief was available to
investors in hotels as the government sought to increase the stock of hotel rooms and hence tourism;
similar breaks were available to individuals who built houses in seaside towns and in rural areas. The
stated aim of these programmes was to instigate ‘rural regeneration’, but there is little available
evidence that they delivered sustainable benefits to the sparsely populated regions earmarked by the0%
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built, vacant rural housing.
As fears for the health of domestic banking systems gripped many countries, the Irish sector was
initially quite bullish about the ability to remain outside of the global turmoil. The chief financial
regulator, Patrick Neary, assured concerned parties in September 2008 that it is “.important to point
out that Irish banks have only very limited exposures to US subprime losses and related credit prod-
ucts.” While this statement was true, it missed the Irish economy’s over-dependence on a domestic
property market bubble. He went on to say: “Irish banks are resilient and have good shock absorption
capacity to cope with the current situation.”
As mentioned above, a considerable decline in lending standards occurred in the Irish mortgage
market; an increasing proportion of lending was done at higher loan-to-value, higher income multi-
ples, longer maturities, and with interest-only periods. The only step the regulator took to stem the
decline in lending standards was to increase to 100% the risk-weighting on the portion of a residential
mortgagewritten above an 80% loan-to-value threshold. As Honohan (2009) notes, this was aweak and
ineffective response.
In summary, regulators and policymakers in both countries made erroneous decisions in response
to political pressures. The specific nature of the errors, and the types of pernicious political influences,
differ substantially in the two cases. Another notable distinction is in the nature of the regulatory policy
errors in the two jurisdictions. US regulators (along with a substantial proportion of the economics
research community) failed to appreciate the dangerous fragility of the extremely complex interactions
linking several technically sophisticated US financial markets. The economic research community is
now building theoretical models which explain the ensuing credit-liquidity gridlock. In contrast, in
Ireland, the regulatory mistakes were simple misjudgements, obviously flawed relative to standard
regulatory procedures widely available at the time.
6. Moral hazard
Moral hazard occurs when an agent has an incentive to take economically inefficient actions because
the agent is insulated from the risky consequences of his behaviour. Moral hazard problems played
a big role in both the US and Irish crises, but in quite different forms.
As discussed in Section 2, the US credit-liquidity crisis had its origin in a large increase in the stock of
poor- quality mortgages in the USA during 2000–2006. This unsustainable increase in low-credit-
quality mortgages can be traced back, at least in part, to the severe moral hazard problems in the
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mortgage originators sell mortgage loan assets on to other parties who then securitize them and re-sell
them in packaged form. Mortgage originators have little or no incentive to monitor credit quality of
individual mortgages or to rigorously enforce purported credit standards since they are insulated from
all credit-related losses once the mortgages are sold. Dell’Arriccia et al. (2008) demonstrate convinc-
ingly that this moral hazard problem contributed to the decline in mortgage credit quality in the US
during 2000–2006. They show that the relative credit quality decline during this period was highest in
regions with the highest proportion of securitized mortgages (op. cit. Section V.F, Table 12). Rajan et al.
(2008) show that as the percentage of securitized loans increased in regional areas, loan originators
created a bias in the perceived credit quality by substituting “hard” credit information on borrowers
(information which could be documented and used in the securitization process) at the expense of
“soft” information about the true credit quality of individual borrowers. In a related paper, Keys et al.
(2008) show that loan originator laxness in screening mortgage applicant credit quality is directly
related to the probability that a given loan will be securitized. See also Diamond and Rajan (2008) on
the importance of the mortgage credit quality decline, caused by the originate-and-distribute lending
system, as a causal factor in the ensuing US credit-liquidity crisis. Despite its centrality to the US crisis,
this particular moral hazard problem has no relevance to the Irish credit crisis. Throughout the pre-
crisis period Irish banks used the originate-and-hold lending system, for both residential mortgage
and business lending. Almost all the loans that the Irish banks generated remained on their own
balance sheets. This crucial component of the US crisis is virtually absent in the Irish case.
A moral hazard problem associated with performance-related-pay in the financial services industry
was another key driver of the US crisis. Kashyap et al. (2008) note that the imperfections linking
management true performance and long-run share value mean that managers are over-incentivized to
hold “tail risk” – essentially, traders are incentivized to have a portfolio or trading strategy earning
a reliable stream of modest insurance-premium-like income in exchange for accepting (on behalf of
their firm) a small-probability risk of a very large loss. If, during the career of a trader, a negative tail
event is realized, he/she can exercise his/her “trader put option” and resign from the firm (or be fired),
leaving firm shareholders to cover the large loss.9 This loss truncation in performance-related-pay is
amoral hazard problem since the trader is insulated from the risky consequences of his actions and this
adversely affects his incentives to avoid excessive risk. The return distribution feature of frequent
modest profits plus infrequent negative tail risk fits the return distribution of mortgage-related
securitized assets and mortgage credit derivatives. Franke and Krahnen (2008) argue that the mis-
aligned incentives in financial-management compensation, along with the moral hazard problem of
loan originators in the originate-and-distribute loan generation system, were the two basic underlying
causes of the US crisis. Brunnermeier (2009) shows that the incentive for excessive risk-taking by
investment managers is worsened by a low-interest-rate environment. Unusually low interest rates
characterized the pre-crisis periods in both countries. On a separate but related point, Agarwal and
Wang (2009) show that performance-related compensation for middle managers in the US
mortgage-generation industry also contributed to the decline in average credit quality.
The moral hazard problem associated with loss truncation in performance-related compensation in
financial services also has relevance in the Irish case. As discussed earlier, Irish banks borrowed cheaply
in the interbank Euro market and invested these borrowed funds in loans to domestic property
developers. On the one hand, the risk-return distribution of this very risky strategy does not have the
classic “tail risk” pattern of securitized mortgage assets and related credit derivatives. On the other
hand, when the strategy went badly wrong, the “trader put option”was successfully exercised bymany
senior executives in the Irish domestic banks. Recall from Section 2 above that there were two rogue
institutions, Anglo Irish Bank and Irish Nationwide Building Society, who stoked the fires of the bubble
with particularly reckless lending practices. Each of these institutions was controlled by a single,
powerful and long-standing chief. When themagnitude of the bad loans at the two institutions became
clear, along with a host of accounting and share trading irregularities, both of these bank heads were9 Admittedly the reputation and future earnings of the trader will be hurt but the financial losses fall on shareholders and/or
domestic taxpayers in the event of a government bailout.
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little or any hope of financial recourse by taxpayers or others.
Of course, both the US poor-credit-quality mortgages and Irish risky property development loans
involved conscious decisions by borrowers as well as lenders. In the case of poor-credit-quality US
mortgages the borrowers were individual households with relatively low incomes. The property loans
issued by Irish banks were obtained by wealthy property developers, arguably well-informed, rational
actors with considerable business acumen. It is not clear whether amoral hazard argument can explain
their behaviour. Personal guarantees were a standard component of property development loan
contracts in Ireland during the pre-crisis period, so most of these developers did not have recourse to
the trader put option. Irish property developers are legally liable for the “tail risk” in the net value of
these loans, including de jure claims against their personal assets.
This brings us to another potential contributor factor to the moral hazard problem in the Irish case:
weak law enforcement. The legal framework for personal bankruptcy in Ireland is antiquated and
rarely activated. Although property developers signed de jure claims against their personal assets as
part of their bank loan contracts, many commentators believe that these claims are de facto unen-
forceable in Ireland. There is also the concern in Ireland that politically powerful agents have the ability
tomanipulate regulatory and legislative processes to avoid liability for large losses. Most large property
developers in Ireland have been very closely connected to the largest10 political party, Fianna Fáil. Kelly
(2009) uses the term “too connected to fail” for this feature of the Irish business environment; referring
to political connections rather than banking linkages.
With regard to weak law enforcement, the situation in Ireland is dramatically different from that in
the USA, where corporate, financial regulatory, securities and bankruptcy laws are enforced with
unusual strictness and severity by international standards. This is another distinctive difference
between the two crises.
There are other moral hazard problems statistically linked to financial crises which may or may not
have had some role in the two cases under consideration here. Moral hazard problems associated with
bank deposit insurance have been exhaustively studied. On the one hand, deposit insurance is
a powerful tool in preventing bank runs. On the other hand, guaranteed liability holders have no
incentive to monitor bank riskiness or to shift their deposits (or other insured liabilities) away from
errant banks. This gives banks and other financial institutions a moral hazard incentive to increase the
riskiness of their balance sheets unduly. Moral hazard behaviour associated with deposit insurance is
widely assigned a large role in the US savings and loan crisis of the early 1980s, e.g., Keeley (1990). It
had no obvious role in the more recent US crisis. Attention has shifted towards the implicit liability
guarantees which will exist whenever the ex post optimal government response to an existing crisis
would be to insure or save large, ailing financial institutions, the “too big to fail” problem. Some
commentators argue that the U.S. government’s decision to step in and save Bear Sterns worsened the
magnitude of the ensuing crisis since it led other financial services firms to believe that they had an
implicit bailout guarantee and could act accordingly, e.g., Cohan (2010).
Did themoral hazard associated with liability guarantees or bank bailouts have an influence on Irish
bank behaviour? During the pre-crisis period, Irish banks had access to only limited government-
supported deposit insurance. However, the government’s first action after the Lehman Brothers
collapsewas to institutewith immediate effect a government-funded blanket guarantee of all domestic
Irish banks’ liabilities. The Irish government’s ex post guarantee even covered equity holders since, as
mentioned earlier, as the banks’ core equity capital deteriorated, the government supplied equity
capital directly to the banks. It also set up the National Asset Management Agency whose remit to pay
“the long-term economic value,” as opposed to current market value, for distressed property loans
helped to keep the privately owned equity capital in the banks from collapsing to zero.
Ex post, Irish domestic banks were blessed with extremely generous bailout policies by the
government. Was this “implicit guarantee” foreseen by the banks ex ante, and did this affect their
behaviour? For the two largest Irish domestic banks, there was probably some foresight that if their10 In a dramatic fall from grace, the Fianna Fáil party suffered an historic loss in the February 2011 national elections, falling to
third place among parties in voting percentage; this occurred after the period under discussion here.
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save the institutions. This certainly turned out to be the case, and such an outcome seems predictable
ex-ante. So the “too big to fail” implicit guarantee moral hazard problem seems relevant to the Irish
crisis, with “too big to fail” recalibrated to the small absolute size of the Irish banking system.
In summary, moral hazard problems played a big role in both crises, but in surprisingly different
forms. Themoral hazard problem in the originate-and-distributemortgage systemplayed a central role
in setting the stage for the US crisis. This market featurewas almost entirely absent in Ireland where an
originate-and-hold loan generation system was dominant. The moral hazard associated with loss
truncation in performance-related-pay had a role in both the US and Irish crises. Weak law enforce-
ment was another source of moral hazard in Ireland, but this does not apply in the USA where the
enforcement of corporate and financial regulatory law and personal bankruptcy law is unusually strict
by international standards. Whether the moral hazard problems associated with financial firm bailouts
had an important role in the two crises is difficult to discern with any confidence.
7. Summary and conclusions
The US credit-liquidity crisis of 2007–08 and the subsequent Irish credit crisis were nearly
contemporary, and also have some causal connections, since reverberations from the US crisis precipi-
tated the Irish crisis. Nonetheless, at a superficial level theyare surprisingly different. This paper explores
the similarities and differences between the two crises. We identify four broadly defined common
features in the causal foundations of the two crises. The four common features are asset price bubbles,
capital bonanzas, regulatory imprudence, andmoral hazard. Looking inmore detail at each of these four
common features, we find that their particular manifestations are quite different in the two crises.
This modest two-crisis comparison cries out for more research. Are the four common features that
we identify present in a broader sample of financial crises in recent decades? Are there additional
common features that we havemissed, or alternative taxonomies?We find in our comparison of the US
and Irish crises that the particularities of the crises are very different. In a broader sample of crises, is
there a similar diversity in the specific causal mechanisms generating the crises?
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